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BLEST BE THE TIE THAT BINDS 
Joan He!fetz Hollinger* 
THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY. By Mary Ann Glen-
don. Toronto: Butterworths. 1981. Pp. xvii, 269. $19.95. 
Mary Ann Glendon's The New Family and the New Property is an ambi-
tious, informative and socially conservative account of the legal aspects of 
the relations between family structure and economic structure in the ad-
vanced industrial societies of America and Western Europe. 1 Glendon's 
central claim is that economic and legal ties within families have become 
attenuated, while each individual's ties to work and government have tight-
ened. The role of the family as a source of economic support and as a 
determinant of social standing for its members has diminished, especially 
during the past hundred years; in the process, legal and emotional bonds 
between husbands and wives, and between parents and children have loos-
ened.2 In the late twentieth century a "new family" has displaced the tradi-
tional one that was formerly reinforced by the law.3 Glendon's concept of 
the "new family" represents, she tells us, "a variety of co-existing family 
types" (pp. 3-4). It is, more accurately, a "no family" expressing the fluid-
ity, detachability and interchangeability of modem personal relationships.4 
It consists of married and remarried couples with or without children; di-
vorced, separated or never-married single parents, mostly women, and their 
• Assistant Professor, University of Detroit School of Law. B.A. 1961, Swarthmore Col-
lege; M.A. 1963, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1974, State University of New York 
at Buffalo. - Ed. 
1. Although recent developments in American law and society are the focal point of this 
study, Glendon also discusses developments in English, French, Swedish and West German 
law. For a more detailed analysis of what she says about western European family law and 
social structure, she refers us to her earlier wcrk. See generally M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW 
AND FAMILY (1977). 
2. See, e.g., pp. 1-2, 11, 47, 143. Glendon is generally reluctant to make claims about the 
emotional or affective quality of the relationship between spouses while a marriage lasts. See, 
e.g., pp. 17-18, 13 n.9. Her neglect of the affective aspects of either traditional or modem 
marriages weakens her discussion of the causes of marital instability, where she pays too little 
attention to the role of personal values and ideology. See notes 21-31 infra and accompanying 
text. 
3. Glendon describes the traditional family as patriarchal, marriage-centered, indissoluble 
before the death of a spouse except for serious cause, committed to the subordination of indi-
vidual preferences to the needs of the family unit, and based on a clear division of responsibil-
ity between the husband-father as wage-earner and the wife-mother as homemaker and child-
nurturer. See, e.g., pp. 101-02. 
4. See also pp. 3-4, 12-13. Glendon describes this proliferation of "family types" as the 
perhaps inevitable concomitant of the profound shifts in the meaning and distribution of prop-
erty that have occurred in modem capitalist societies, but she would clearly prefer to live in a 
world where men and women marry once and for keeps. A more sanguine attitude toward the 
"higher degree of pluralism" in contemporary living arrangements can be found in S. LEVITAN 
& R. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY? (1981). 
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children; unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples with or without 
children; and widowed or unmarried individuals living by themselves.5 
Coincident with this proliferation of family types, Glendon explains, 
has been the increased dependence of individuals on "new property" for 
their economic sustenance and social standing. If the "old" property was 
land and pewter bowls, the "new property" refers to jobs, job-related fringe 
benefits, and various forms of public assistance, all of which have come to 
be recognized as entitlements in keeping with the economic reliance upon 
them by more and more individuals.6 The new family and the new prop-
erty are reciprocally related; neither could exist without the other. It is no 
accident, for example, that "in the United States, as elsewhere, divorce for 
cause, disappearing from family law, is finding its way into labor law."7 
5. Of the estimated 82.4 million households in the United States in March 1981, only 73% 
met the Census Bureau's definiton of a family household: two or more persons living together 
and related to each other by blood or marriage. Nearly 27% were defined as nonfamily house-
holds, consisting of individuals living alone or of two or more unrelated persons sharing a 
residence. Since 1970, more than half the increase in the total number of households is attrib-
utable to the growth of nonfamily units. Only 60% of all households now include a married 
couple living together. About half of these married couples live with one or more of their own 
children under the age of 18. In other words, about 30% of all households and slightly more 
than two-fifths of family households consist of a mother and a father and their own children 
under the age of 18. In considerably less than half of these families is the husband the sole 
wage-earner and the mother a full time homemaker. About I 1% of all households arc main-
tained by women living with one or more relatives other than a spouse (an increase of over 
65% since 1970). In more than three-fifths of these households, women who are divorced, 
separated, or never-married live with one of more or their minor children. Another 2.3% of all 
households are maintained by men living with relatives other than a spouse. In about 35% of 
these households, men live with their own minor children. Adults living by themselves com-
prise approximately 23% of all households. The number of unmarried, divorced, separated or 
widowed persons living by themselves increased 75% since 1970; the largest increase has oc-
curred in the 25-34 age group. Of the remaining 3-4% of all households, about half consist of 
unmarried heterosexual couples. The others represent a variety of living arrangements, in-
cluding homosexual couples, elderly adults with live-in housekeepers, college or university 
student roommates, and other unrelated persons sharing a residence. Of the family house-
holds with children, more than one out of five are one-parent families. Although less than 17% 
of all white families are headed by one parent, more that 50% of all black families are headed 
by one parent. Over 90% of all one-parent families are maintained by mothers; the number of 
children under 18 living with one parent has increased by nearly 54% since 1970. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No, 
371, HOUSEHOLD & FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1981, Tables A, B, and accompany-
ing text; SERIES P-20, No. 372, MARITAL STATUS & LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1981, 
Tables D, E, F, 4, 5 (June 1982); SERIES P-20, No. 374, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 1981 Table D (Sept. 1982). See a/so A Portrait of America, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, 
at 20-33 for a report of the most up-to-date population statistics from the Census Bureau. 
6. Glendon borrows the term "new property" from Charles Reich. See Reich, T/1e New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). She uses it, as he and others have, to declare that in the 
twentieth century the principal forms of wealth and the main determinants of social and eco-
nomic status are legally protected entitlements to work-related and government-derived bene-
fits such as seniority, pensions, health care, profit-sharing and stock-ownership plans, 
unemployment and disability insurance, social security, and public income assistance. See pp. 
185-92; Reich, supra at 733. Glendon is sensitive to the ways in which race and sex discrimina-
tion hinder access to certain jobs and thus to employment-related new property. She is also 
aware of the precariousness of all new property entitlements during times of prolonged reces-
sion, inflation or high unemployment. See, e.g., pp. 192-98. 
7. P. 153. She is referring to the contrast between the recent easing of the legal restrictions 
on divorce and the increase of statutory, contractual, regulatory, and judicially-imposed con-
straints on an employer's ability to discharge employees. 
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Glendon claims further that the new family and the new property reflect 
changes in contemporary private and public law that are, in tum, part of a 
more general transformation of law in the twentieth century. Contract is 
being replaced as the major ordering or legitimating principle by a system 
of law that is regulatory, administrative, increasingly public and bureau-
cratic.8 This system operates directly upon the individual; it weakens and 
threatens to annihilate the family as well as all institutions that might serve 
to mediate between individuals and the large-scale occupational and other 
organizational hierarchies to which they are bound. Glendon here joins the 
chorus of literary and social scientific voices that sing the mournful tune of 
Max Weber. Further "bureaucratization of the legal order" (p. 224), she 
warns, can push us all into the "iron cage."9 Our only hope to escape this 
imprisonment may be a renewal of ancient faiths that foster community 
and stewardship instead of autonomy and ownership (pp. 238-45). Glendon 
implies that the modern "liberated" individual is too selfish in his or her 
purported striving for self-realization.10 We must transcend individualism, 
she says, and renew our "sense of connectedness" (p. 239) with each other 
and to unborn, future generations. To avoid being locked into the iron 
cage, she offers us Homer's "golden chain linking the heavens and all the 
creatures of the earth together" (p. 243). 
Glendon's argument is presented on two levels, one grandly abstract, 
the other strictly nuts and bolts. She offers a veritable warehouse of data 
about contemporary legal developments, 11 but there are few stairways to 
the upper level where her history and sociology reside. Glendon's history is 
derived from the work of Lawrence Stone and other historians of western 
Europe; she uses it to explain the emergence of what she has dubbed the 
new family and the new property.12 Glendon's sociology is derived from 
Max Weber, Jurgen Habermas and some recent scholars of American con-
tract law;13 she uses it to explain the apparent absorption of private law in 
the twentieth century into the bureaucratic grip of the modem administra-
8. See generally ch. 5. 
9. P. 236. For the original score, see M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT 
OF CAPITALISM 181 (T. Parson, trans. 1958). 
10. Glendon usually places the words "liberated" or "freed" within quotation marks, as if 
to suggest that the terms are merely slogans and cannot be used to denote serious or genuine 
striving for individual emotional or intellectual fulfillment. She is also unclear as to precisely 
what kinds of "liberation" she has the most doubts about: is it economic, emotional, sexual, or 
political? See, e.g., pp. 13, 19, 46, 138-40, 198-205. For further discussion of her definition of 
and attitude toward individual autonomy, see notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text. 
11. She discusses family law, succession law, employment law, property law, contract law 
and social welfare law. 
12. See generally THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD (L. de Mause ed. 1974); E. SHORTER, THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1977); L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN 
ENGLAND 1500-1800 (1977); Konig, Sociological Introduction, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO· 
PEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 1, at 20-73 (1974); and the works by other European histori-
ans and historical sociologists that Glendon cites in chapter 1. The one remotely historical 
work on the American family that Glendon refers to is C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS 
WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1977), a diatribe against the alleged invasion of the family 
by the "helping professions." 
13. In discussing recent developments in contract law, Glendon relies on the work of Law-
rence Friedman, Ian Macneil and, to a lesser extent, Grant Gilmore. See pp. 215-27. 
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tive state. It is fair to call both her history and her sociology "abstract" 
because her use of each remains general and imprecise. While Stone and 
Weber provide Glendon with some plausible bases for her excursions into 
comparative law, 14 they serve her poorly within her main area of concern, 
modem America. She does not sufficiently demonstrate how recent trends 
in American family and property law depend on the historical and socio-
logical categories she invokes to explain these trends. 
What Glendon has to say about modern America is best understood and 
assessed if we begin with the basic historical matrix of her book. We can 
then move to her treatment of a more specific historical and sociological 
question central to her analysis: why have divorce rates risen? Within this 
setting, we can examine her discussion of how the law deals with divorce 
and its economic consequences. This will enable us, in turn, to address her 
claims about the reciprocal relationship between employment patterns and 
family law. This path through Glendon's book will show us how her con-
servatism and her distrust for "individualism" emerge from the shadows of 
Stone, then Weber, into the uncertain light of her own faith in the values 
associated with the traditional family. Although Glendon's program for 
how the law might help us recapture these values is in the end elusive, she 
nonetheless presents some illuminating and useful observations along the 
way. 
I. HISTORICAL SOURCES OF MARITAL INSTABILITY 
Lawrence Stone studied the social evolution of England from 1500 to 
1800. He found that the open-lineage family groups whose wealth and sta-
tus depended on land gradually gave way to a new patriarchal family type, 
less closely bound to kinship relationships outside the immediate nuclear 
family. As marriage became more directed to mutual affection and com-
panionship, the family became structured around the husband-father as 
provider and decisionmaker; the wife-mother raised the children and main-
tained the home as a refuge from the outside world of acquisitive enter-
prise. 15 The advance of industrialization, however, drew wives and to some 
extent children into the labor force. As economic conditions undermined 
the integrity of the family as a self-sufficient support unit, emotional ties 
within the family became both more intense and more fragile. The law, 
which had permitted termination of marriage before death only for serious 
14. Glendon's frequent references to legal developments in various western European 
countries sometimes serve as a useful counterpoint to her discussion of American law, indicat-
ing how our legal response to changes in family and economic structure is similar to or differ-
ent from that of other societies. Her most interesting comparisons are in employment law. 
The basic legal guarantee of job security that now prevails, at least in principle, in France and 
West Germany and to some extent in Sweden and England, is contrasted to the much more 
halting and uneven movement of our own legal system toward limiting the common-law doc-
trine of employment-at-will. See ch. 4. Also interesting are the examples she cites from Soviet 
bloc countries to illustrate how even the most massively supported state policies, such as the 
Soviet Union's efforts to increase the birth rate, are thwarted by "law-resistant" human behav-
ior. See pp. 127-29. On the whole, however, Glendon's comparative legal analysis is disap-
pointing. She reports but does not explain adequately the different responses of various 
societies to conditions co=on to all. 
IS. See generally L. STONE, supra note 12. 
March 1983] The Tie That Binds 1069 
cause, eventually reflected this loosening of the family's economic and emo-
tional bonds. 
Glendon reports that a similar social transition took place in America. 16 
But she does not relate this conclusion specifically to our history, and tells 
us nothing about whether or when the family type described by Stone arose 
here and evolved in the nineteenth century, long after Stone's history had 
run its course. This failure is indefensible in view of the recent outpouring 
of scholarship on American social and family history, including the legal 
aspects of that history. 17 Glendon could have drawn profitably upon these 
studies to help substantiate as well as qualify her claims about the general 
relevance of Stone's work to American history, and about the role of prop-
erty and economic conditions in shaping family behavior and ideas about 
the law. Had she absorbed the findings of this scholarship, she might have 
been more sensitive to the texture and nuances of married life in nine-
teenth-century America, 18 and to the complexity of the historical nexus be-
16. Glendon moves rapidly from her summary of Stone's historical model, pp. 11-14, to a 
discussion of the image of the traditional family embodied in the French Civil Code of 1804, 
pp. 14-17, then to a description of the "loose bonding" allegedly characteristic of the twentieth-
century family, pp. 17-20, and then to a detailed discussion of American succession law and 
how it contrasts to spousal support law at divorce, pp. 20-29. She then returns briefly to the 
sixteenth century to illuminate her analysis of the significance of divorce in late twentieth-
century America and Western Europe, pp. 29-36. 
17. The best general introduction to this recent scholarship is C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: Wo-
MEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980). Degler 
has been justifiably criticized for his failure to analyze significant social and economic devel-
opments since the 1960's, and for the uneven quality of what he says about certain aspects of 
family life and domestic ideology in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, he is quite persua-
sive in arguing that Stone's model is indeed relevant to the basic contours of American social 
history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And his analysis of the connections 
among the ideal of affection-based marriage, the improved status of women in the early nine-
teenth century, and the social recognition of the importance of the childrearing function is 
excellent. So, too, is his demonstration of how women were centrally involved in the late 
nineteenth century in efforts to control both sexuality and fertility. Degler's work is chiefly a 
summary of and commentary upon the specialized research of others, but it succeeds in setting 
forth the variety of ways in which women strove for autonomy within and from the patriarchal 
family long before the emergence of the new property and economic structure that Glendon 
credits so heavily for undermining family ties. He also shows how the increased participation 
in the work force by wives as well as husbands has often reinforced and not just challenged the 
traditi!mal family structure. In addition to the specialized studies cited in Degler, other recent 
works relevant to Glendon's thesis include: N. BASCH, IN THE Eves OF THE LAW: WOMEN, 
MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 19TH CENTURY New YORK (1982), (a study of the Married 
Women Property Laws in New York State); M. NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVO-
LUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800 (1980), especially valuable for its 
analysis of the role of Republican ideology in reshaping women's attitudes toward themselves 
and their families, id at 228-99; M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN 
ONEIDA COUNTY, New YORK, 1790-1865 (1981); THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL Hls-
TORIAL PERSPECTIVE (M. Gordon ed. 2d ed. 1978); and the influential and methodologically 
innovative study by Daniel Scott Smith, Family Limitation, Sexual Control, and Domestic Fem-
inism in Victorian America, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN 222 (N. Cott & E. Pleck eds. 1979). 
18. See, e.g., works cited in note 17 supra; N. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WO-
MEN'S SPHERE" IN New ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); A. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF 
AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HIS-
TORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); K. SKLAR, CATHERINE BEECHER: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN DOMESTICITY (1973); L. PERRY, CHILDHOOD, MARRIAGE, AND REFORM: HENRY 
CLARKE WRIGHT 1797-1870 (1980); Smith-Rosenberg, Beauty, the Beast, and the Militant Wo-
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tween different kinds of families and the industrial economy. 19 She might 
have been less inclined, moreover, to idealize the traditional family and 
more willing to concede what Tamara Hareven insists: that "the family has 
never been a utopian retreat from the world, except in the imagination of 
social reformers and social scientists."20 
Confined by Stone's vision of social history, Glendon cannot adequately 
explain the historical phenomenon of principal concern to her, the marked 
increase of marital instabilty in late twentieth century America.21 Perhaps 
it is unreasonable to expect Glendon to answer so intractable a question as 
why divorce rates continue to go up and up. Yet she chooses to address the 
issue, in the same terms and with largely the same orientation as that of the 
social critics who were concerned by rising divorce rates in the l 890's. 
A lively debate was then stimulated when the Census Bureau began re-
leasing its first divorce statistics, showing sharp rises in the divorce rate22 
man: A Case Study in Sex Roles and Soda/ Stress in Jacksonian America, 23 AMER. Q. 562 
(1971). 
19. Some of the best recent scholarship on the nexus between work and the family and on 
women's entry into the work force includes: s. KENNEDY, IF ALL WE DID WAS TO WEEP AT 
HOME: A HISTORY OF WHIT!3 WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN AMERICA (1979); A. KESSLER· 
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1982); L. TENTLER, WAGE-EARNING WOMEN: INDUSTRIAL WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1900-1930 (1979); W. WANDERSEE, WOMEN'S WORK AND FAMILY VALUES, 
1920-1940 (1981); Bodnar, Immigration, Kinship, and the Rise of Working-Class Realism in In-
dustrial America, 14 J. Soc. HIST. 44 (1980). These works suggest that married women's work 
outside the home often went along with a strong commitment to family values and did not 
necessarily reflect a desire for autonomy. 
20. Hareven, Family Time and Historical Time, DAEDALUS, Spring 1977, at 57, 69. Glen-
don cites Hareven's article, but not this comment. Instead, Glendon quotes with nostalgic ap• 
probation Hareven's reference to a traditional "familistic" ideology whereby "[c]ollective 
family decisions took precedence over individual preferences." P. 46 ( quoting Hareven, supra 
at 64). In contrast to this, Glendon presents her own characterization of the sorry plight of the 
late twentieth-century individual, "constrained by the economic realities of the workplace, and 
'liberated' not only from the confinement of networks of family and kin but from the support 
that those networks once provided." P. 46. 
21. America has the highest divorce rate in the western world. About one million mar-
riages now end in divorce each year. Although the divorce rate in this country has risen more 
or less continuously since the late nineteenth century, it is only in the past 20-30 years that the 
proportion of all marriages in any given year that eventually end in divorce has increased at a 
faster and faster rate. Glendon cites estimates that 30-40% of all marriages entered into in the 
1970's will end in divorce. P. 29 n.67. A more recent estimate is that the proportion will be 
closer to 48%. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, SERIES 3, No. 19, NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION AND SURVIVORSHIP (1980). In 1981, the divorce ratio 
was 109 divorced persons for every 1,000 persons who were married and living with their 
spouses. This is more than twice the 1970 ratio of 47 divorced persons for every 1,000 married 
persons. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 372, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1981, 
Table C and accompanying text (1982). 
22. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE 1867-1907, at 11-12 (1909). The number of divorces in the United States rose from 
approximately 10,000 in 1867 to more than 25,000 in 1886, an increase of 157 percent. During 
the same period, the whole population had increased by about 100 percent. Id. at 12. During 
the 1890s, the number of divorces increased to over 50,000, a growth rate nearly three times the 
rate of growth of the population. Id. These reports do not provide any information about the 
rates of informal separation or desertion during the late nineteenth century. One of the strik-
ing features of this data is that it helped dispel the belief that legal divorce was largely a 
middle-class phenomenon. The 226,000 legal divorces granted between 1886-1906 were dis-
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since the Civil War. Most commentators pointed to a combination of eco-
nomic, environmental and personal reasons for the increase.23 While a few 
observers approved the egalitarian potential of the economic emancipation 
of women, 24 most viewed female participation in the industrial work force 
as the incipient cause - mediated through urbanization, poverty and cor-
ruption25 -of the destruction of traditional family life.26 Most commenta-
tors, then, shared a view of life that Glendon now claims is characteristic of 
the 1980's: for good or ill, increasing reliance on employment rather than 
family relationships for economic sustenance will inevitably pull the family 
apart.27 
Glendon herself adopts an uncritical and general attitude toward the 
economic determinants of marital stability similar to that which pervaded 
the tum-of-the-century debate. She fails to assign consistent weights to the 
factors contributing to the fragility of the modem marriage. At some 
points she emphasizes environmental and economic conditions (pp. 17-19, 
31-32); at others, she implies that divorce is the product of a pathological 
desire for individual "choice" or "liberation" (pp. 30, 44-45, 138-39). She 
firmly rejects the suggestion that either fault-based or fault-free divorce 
laws can have much direct effect on marital stability, but she argues else-
where that some public laws designed to aid individuals may indirectly 
weaken families (pp. 125-38). She almost never admits that divorce might 
be a normal or healthy response by some women and men to their mutual 
failure to achieve the ideals of the genuinely companionate marriage. 
Glendon's treatment of the link between the entry of women into the 
labor force and the divorce rate is unclear (p. 51 ), especially in light of the 
recent research findings on these issues by Cherlin, Ross and Sawhill, and 
others.28 These findings strengthen the claim that increased employment 
tributed among all social and economic groups roughly in proportion to these groups' repre-
sentation within the population as a whole. Id at 43. Interesting data and observations of the 
relationship between divorce and marriage rates between 1860-1920 may be found in P. 
JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1959). 
23. The tum-of-the-century debate on the causes and consequences of divorce is discussed 
in L. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 27-83 (1980); 
W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1967); M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: 
PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 460-72 {1977). 
24. The evolutionary socialist Arthur Callioun, for example, forecast that as women gained 
access to "economic opportunity outside of marriage,'' the family would undergo "individua-
tion," would no longer be "a forced grouping" and would move toward "ethical unity and 
spontaneous democracy." 3 A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 
157-58 (1919). Similarly, feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman predicted that women's economic 
independence would lead to more egalitarian, and thus healthier and more harmonious, mari-
tal relations. C. GILMAN, THE HOME: ITS WORK AND INFLUENCE (1903). 
25. See, for example, the writings of sociologists Charles A. Ellwood and James P. Lich-
tenberger, as summarized by HALEM, supra note 23, at 57-59. 
26. See, for example, the introductory section of J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1895), or the warnings of Congregational Minister Sa-
muel W. Dike, an organizer of the National League for Protection of the Family, in L. HALEM, 
supra note 23, at 56, and W. O'NEILL, supra note 23, at 48-56. 
27. According to one historian of American law, the family had become, by the late nine-
teenth century, little more than "a mere temporary meeting-place of individual wage-earners." 
3 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 227-28 (1904). 
28. See Cherlin, Work Life and Marital .Dissolution, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 151-66 
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by women may indeed be a cause of marital instability. Yet many scholars, 
including Cherlin, continue to believe that the primary impetus to separate 
from one's spouse comes from more elusive personal and emotional needs, 
encouraged by recent changes in attitudes toward the social acceptability of 
divorce.29 
In fact, for most of the population, it is not marriage itself that is unpop-
ular; most people try it at least once. Rather, particular marriages are ex-
tremely vulnerable for more subtle and complex reasons than Glendon 
suggests. Many married women who work do not get divorced, or like most 
divorced men and women, are likely to remarry if they do.30 High divorce 
rates for couples composed of two working individuals do not mean that the 
divorce rate is low among couples in which only the husband is a wage 
earner. And for those marriages that remain intact, many may hold to-
gether precisely because both spouses work. Equality between partners, 
higher income, and independent interests may sustain a relationship that 
would not long survive as a traditional marriage. 
Although Glendon does not substantially advance our understanding of 
the causes of marital instability, she has much to say about the response of 
the legal system to both divorce and its economic consequences. This is the 
most important part of her book, and it is here that the limits of her analysis 
of the "new family" and the "new property" become most clear. She shows 
how the law has retreated from the task of keeping marriages intact, while it 
has at the same time increased its regulation of the economic aftermath of 
marital breakdown. This observation about the migration of the law from 
the center to the sidelines, so to speak, of the American family is of course 
sound.31 So, too is her point that this migration entails the taking over by 
public law of what had once been a matter largely for private law enforce-
ment. Yet there are persistent ambiguities and dead ends in her account 
and in her attempts to clarify and choose among the alternative policies 
which these legal changes might suggest. 
(G. Levinger & 0. Moles eds. 1979); H. Ross & I. SAWHILL, TIME OF TRANSITION: THE 
GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY WOMEN (1975). A recent survey of300 women business 
executives, 66% of whom are earning between $50,000 and $125,000 per annum, found that 
nearly 17% of these women have been divorced. In contrast, less than 3% of a comparable 
group of male executives have been divorced. Most of the divorced women acknowledged that 
their careers were in part responsible for the break-up of their marriages. Only 40.7% of all 
these women executives are married, compared with nearly 95% of the similar group of male 
executives. Fowler, Careers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1982, at B45, col. I. 
29. See A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 46-49 (1981); Klemesrud, Survey 
Finds Major Shffes in Attitudes of Women, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1980, at Cl, col. I; id at C6, 
col. 2. See generally Degler, supra note 17, at 144-77, 436-73. 
30. Pp. 29-30. About five out of six men and three out of four women remarry after a 
divorce; most remarriages occur within three years after divorce. Recent studies suggest that 
there is a somewhat greater risk of divorce among remarried couples than for first marriages. 
See A. CHERLIN, supra note 29, at 29-31. 
31. Virtually every family law scholar has noted that since the advent of no-fault divorce 
laws in the 1970s, a profound shift has occurred in the focus of matrimonial law from moral to 
economic issues. See, e.g., Dullea, Wide Changes in Family L{fe are Altering the Family Law, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at Al, col. 3; .Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 
42-48. 
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II. SOCIOLOGY AND POLICY 
These ambiguities and dead ends appear just as Glendon begins to say 
something different from what was said by the tum-of-the-century com-
mentators. They were generally optimistic about the capacity of the law to 
attack the economic and environmental causes of marital instability.32 
Glendon has had enough experience with the regulatory and public welfare 
apparatus initiated in the early twentieth century to doubt the old Progres-
sive faith that the state could easily take over many of the tasks once per-
formed by families, or that laws could bolster and revive shaky marital ties. 
In place of the now discredited faith of the Progressives, Glendon offers 
the functionalist social science of Max Weber and of Weber's student and 
Glendon's own mentor, Max Rheinstein. In keeping with the insight of this 
tradition that the legitimacy of law is threatened as the divergence grows 
between statutory law and the law as practiced,33 Glendon seems resigned 
to the widespread enactment of fault-free divorce laws. In America, fault-
based divorce laws were never able to prevent marital instability or to re-
duce the rate or number of divorces granted by our courts. Even in coun-
tries such as Italy and Ireland, where secular and canon laws still attempt to 
sustain a view of marriage as indissoluble until death, marital stability has 
not increased. To the contrary, it is secular and religious laws that have had 
to accommodate to diverse patterns of marital behavior. Although the for-
mal grounds for divorce have not been relaxed in either Italy or Ireland, 
their laws are being applied flexibly and expansively to particular cases in 
much the same way that our fault-based divorce laws were applied prior to 
the statutory reforms of the 1970's (pp. 120-25). 
In America, according to Glendon, the law has attempted to salvage its 
legitimacy for determining the requirements for marital termination by be-
coming both more "realistic" and more "neutral" in its response to prevail-
ing patterns of behavior and diverse social norms. But why didn't divorce 
law retreat sooner from its earlier and apparently futile effort to support the 
traditional model of marriage? As usual, Glendon's explanation empha-
sizes economic conditions more than ideology or changing attitudes. The 
same forces that she says promote marital instability - the declining im-
portance of the conjugal family as a source of economic sustenance or as a 
status determinant for its members and the concomitant rise of new prop-
erty entitlements - enable the law to withdraw from efforts to restrict the 
grounds for legal divorce. When the economic stakes are lower, it is easier 
for the law to pull back (pp. 32, 117, 139). 
Glendon applauds one manifestation of this trend towards less law: the 
creation in a few states of summary proceedings for marital dissolution. 
Similar in function to the simplified proceedings now available in many 
jurisdictions for settling small estates at death, summary divorce is in her 
view a sensible way for couples with no children, minimal assets and a mar-
riage of short duration to terminate their legal relationship. Much less 
32. For a general description of Progresive attitudes on this subject, see Busacca & Ryan, 
Beyond the Family Crisis, DEMOCRACY, Fall 1982, at 79, 83-84; L. HALEM, supra note 23, at 
49-51, 81-83. 
33. See generally M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW (1972). 
1074 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1065 
palatable to her is what she sees as a potential consequence of fault-free 
divorce: the apparent right of "unilateral termination" where one spouse 
exercises his or her "freedom of choice to dispose of the other."34 Divorce 
law may be becoming more neutral; Glendon is not. She speaks as though 
people shed their spouses as casually as snakes shed their skins. It is indeed 
easier in a technical sense to obtain a divorce in the 1980's than it was as 
recently as 1960, but accounts of the divorce process suggest that the experi-
ence is extremely painful and that the emotional toll is high regardless of 
whether both spouses or only one wants to terminate the marriage and re-
gardless of whether or not there are children.35 Does her disdain for "uni-
lateral termination" mean that she would not permit divorce in the absence 
of mutual consent of the spouses? She herself acknowledges that stricter 
divorce laws cannot compel people to live together or to love one another.36 
Perhaps her concern is that children will suffer if their parents can too easily 
shed each other. She is surely aware, though, that some judges will delay 
the granting of a divorce to a couple with children until they are convinced 
that the parents' marriage cannot be salvaged, and that some states set 
longer waiting periods after a divorce petition is filed for couples with 
children. 37 
Glendon's claim that the easing of legal restrictions on divorce is the 
inevitable consequence of the dwindling economic significance of marriage 
is also troubling. Certainly, most American families do not support them-
selves with inherited wealth or with the income generated by tangible assets 
such as land or stocks and bonds. Nor are there many American families 
which are self-contained economic units producing their own goods and 
services. Yet most intact familes do share income earned by their members 
and do support themselves. Even though the income that sustains family 
members is likely to be some form of "new property," its acquisition is 
typically made possible by the uncompensated homemaking and child-care 
services provided by both spouses or, as is still the case in most marriages, 
by the wife whether or not she is also employed as a wage-earner. And as 
Glendon admits in her final chapter, family ties continue to have a signifi-
cant impact on an individual's level of educational and occupational 
34. See pp. 32-36. Glendon perceives summary divorce as much less important than uni-
lateral divorce. See p. 112 .. 
35. See, e.g., J. EPSTEIN, DIVORCED IN AMERICA 11 (1974); Bernard, No News but New 
Ideas, in DIVORCE AND AFTER 3, 5 (P. Bohannan ed. 1971). See generally DIVORCE AND 
AFTER, supra; J. EPSTEIN, supra; J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 
(1980); R. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION (1975); Brooks, Employers Offer Help in IJivorces, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1982, at A20, col. I; Cain, Plight of the Gray IJivorcee, N.Y. Times, Dec, 
19, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 89. 
36. P. 125. Some observers predicted that the easing of divorce laws in some states after 
1970 would encourage a veritable flood-tide of divorces; but as it turned out, the divorce rates 
in most states during the 1970's were roughly the same whether a state had enacted a no-fault 
law or not. See Wright & Stetson, The Impact of No-Fault IJivorce Law Reform on IJivorce In 
American Stales, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 575 (1978). 
37. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.9f: 
In every case where there are dependent minor children under the age of 18 years, no 
proofs or testimony shall be taken in such cases for divorce until the expiration of six 
months from the day the bill of complaint is filed . 
. · 
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achievement.38 In other words, the decline in the role of the family as a 
determinant of an individual's social and economic status is by no means as 
clear nor as complete as Glendon's central thesis would lead us to expect. 
Further, her sketch of the catastrophic economic consequences of divorce 
indicates that the major burden is being borne by the public. A satisfactory 
explanation of the easing of the legal restrictions on divorce calls for more 
than Glendon's claims about lower economic stakes. If anything, it is the 
retreat of the moral aspects of divorce law despite the increased economic 
and social costs of divorce for both individuals and the public that needs to 
be explained. 
Glendon has a great deal to say about the response of the law to the 
economic aftermath of divorce. She offers ample and sobering evidence, as 
has nearly everyone else who has written on this subject,39 of the grim 
financial conditions in which many women and their children find them-
selves after divorce. With depressing clarity, Glendon depicts the sheer 
enormity and complexity of our contemporary spousal and child support 
crisis. Support laws are becoming "more realistic," she says, in their efforts 
to focus on practical problems and in not being too ambitious about the 
prospects for legal regulation of human behavior. These laws are also be-
coming more "neutral" with regard to gender-based obligations. In theory, 
if not in practice, wives as well as husbands are liable for post-divorce 
spousal and child support. Yet, in accommodating to different life styles 
and to competing values, the laws remain "ambivalent" and vacillate be-
tween ideals of community and those of self-sufficiency._ , 
Despite this ambivalence, the law is clearly moving toward a greater 
emphasis on "individualism," and has come to reflect recent constitutional 
notions about personal life. In Glendon's view, hopes for reinforcing ideals 
of mutual devotion to the marital community may be shattered when the 
U.S. Supreme Court begins describing the marital couple as "not an in-
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of 
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-
up."40 Finally, Glendon claims that because private resources are insuffi-
cient to care for the adults and children who are the casualties of "serial 
polygamy," public law, and especially welfare law, must of necessity dis-
place private regulation of the financial consequences of divorce (pp. 52-57, 
68-76, 108-11). 
Glendon believes that property division at the termination of either le-
gal marriages or informal coha}>itations requires even more serious atten-
38. P. 229. See also C. JENCKS, WHO GETS AHEAD? THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC 
SUCCESS IN AMERICA 50-84 (1979). 
39. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20 No. 374, 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: POVERTY § 10 (1982); Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of 
Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614, 165-66 (1982); Weitzman, The Economics 
of .Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support 
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1249-53 (198l);L!fe Below the Povery Line, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 
5, 1982, at 20-28; Sheppard, Single Parent Finds I'!flation and Aid Cuts are Economic Stumbling 
Block, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1982, at A20, col. I. For a sensitive discussion of how marital 
instability and poverty have an especially devastating impact on the Black population, see A. 
CHERLIN, supra note 29, at 93-112. 
40. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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tion than spousal or child support. She observes, as she did in her earlier 
work, a marked divergence between the legal treatment of marriages that 
end in death and those that end in divorce.41 Modem intestacy law 
achieves a rare harmony with what remains of traditional ideals of the 
close-knit companionate marriage that lasts until the death of one of the 
spouses. Succession law's characterization of the "presumed intent" of the 
typical decedent is consistent with what empirical research shows about the 
actual intentions and behavior of married persons with regard to the dispo-
sition of their property at death. In virtually all American jurisdictions, the 
interest of the surviving spouse has gained ascendancy over the interests of 
other blood relations, including the decedent's own children. The one ma-
jor exception to the increased deference of succession law to the interest of 
the surviving spouse is the growing legal recognition that all of the dece-
dent's children or issue, whether born in or out of wedlock, should have at 
least some share of their intestate parent's estate. 
If intestacy law responds to still viable ideals of marital closeness and 
mutuality, the laws governing property division at divorce exemplify, ac-
cording to Glendon, the loos:ness and fluidity of the modem marriage. We 
lack consensus on the kinds of assets that should be subject to division at 
divorce and on the principles by which such division should be made. The 
various "equitable distribution" statutes applicable in most separate prop-
erty as well as community property states amount, in Glendon's view, to 
"discretionary distribution" laws. Even statutes such as the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act which list specific factors to be considered leave 
judges with a broad range of discretion as to what assets should be divided 
and how (pp. 60-62). 
There are good reasons for Glendon's concern about clarifying the func-
tion of the law in this area. The difficulties of enforcing spousal and child 
support obligations have raised hopes about using property distribution at 
divorce as a way to achieve a "clean break" and to assure both spouses and 
their children, if any, some basic level of financial security. Further, as she 
notes, there is probably more property passing at divorce in this country 
now than is transferred at death (p. 57). 
Glendon proposes to check judicial discretion over marital property dis-
tribution by employing a presumptive rule of equal division between the 
spouses of all assets acquired by gainful activity during the marriage. Her 
"rule of convenience" for a fifty-fifty split has much to recommend it (pp. 
63-68). It is a compromise among competing principles and wisely ac-
knowledges the limited capacity of judges to determine what weight to give 
"fault" or "need" or "partnership" or "contributory" or "restitutionary" 
principles in allocating marital assets. It avoids the fictional search for the 
"reasonable" intentions of the parties; the court can use the rule to divide 
assets while recognizing that at divorce the actual intentions of the parties 
may be to hurt each other. The rule discourages exploration in court of the 
intimate details of the marriage. Finally, the proposed rule offers a frame-
work within which the parties can, if they wish, strike their own bargain. 
One wishes that Glendon had gone further in her exploration of a fifty-
41. See M. GLENDON, supra note I, at 247-89. 
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fifty rule to consider whether it could serve as a rule of principle and not 
merely one of convenience. The law may not be able to prevent tb,e break-
up of marriages, but it might continue to embody the companionate ideal 
by treating marriages for however long they last as integrated economic 
unions.42 The law could express a social commitment to assuring spouses 
some portion of the property coming into a marriage while it lasted regard-
less of the reasons for its termination. Federal tax and social security laws 
continue to give "entity" status to married couples; perhaps the same ap-
proach should be reflected in marital property law. The same principle 
might even apply to the division of assets at the termination of an informal 
cohabitation unless the parties could show explicitly that they intended to 
keep their property separate.43 Thus, a fifty-fifty rule might be both "objec-
tive" in the sense of reflecting the actual behavior of most adult cohabitants 
while they lived together, whether or not they were married, and "norma-
tive" in the sense of expressing a view of how such relationships ought to be 
lived. 
In addition to avoiding a sustained analysis of the normative implica-
tions of a fifty-fifty rule, Glendon unfortunately does not give a clear re-
sponse to the crucial question that is now plaguing state courts: precisely 
how are assets acquired by "gainful activity" to be defined? Is she willing 
to include the assorted "new property'' claims many courts are now adding 
to the marital kitty?44 What about professional degrees and licenses? What 
about such "old" property as homemaking and child-care services provided 
by one or both spouses? At the very point where she could spell out system-
atically the implications of her underlying thesis about the changes in the 
law in relation to shifts in the structure of the family and the economy, 
Glendon backs off and offers instead a snide comment about the greed of 
matrimonial lawyers.45 
Another limitation of Glendon's proposed rule is that, as with most re-
buttable presumptions, it invites litigation about the kinds of special cir-
cumstances that warrant a departure from a 50-50 division. Glendon 
herself favors giving a greater share of marital assets to the custodial parent 
whenever the divorced couple have minor children to support. She would 
42. The argument that the law should recognize the marital couple as an economic unit 
functions to enhance the unit rather than the separate fortunes of either spouse is elaborated in 
Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1125 
(1981); Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 
(1977). 
43. Blumberg, supra note 42, proposes a publicly-created status based on the duration of a 
relationship for handling the property and support claims of unmarried and married 
cohabitants. 
44. Glendon characterizes as "imaginative" recent efforts to include pension benefits, sen-
iority, social security or disability payments, educational degrees and the like as among the 
marital assets subject to division. But she does not spell out the rationale for including or 
excluding the value of such assets, nor the arguments for treating them as "property" as op-
posed to using these employment-related benefits exclusively as a source of income to pay 
child or spousal support. Pp. 67-68. 
45. Glendon describes the "search for more property" as ''the kind of law in which the 
matrimonial bar takes an abiding interest, but not the kind that needs the the most attention," 
pp. 67-68. Similarly she says, ''the only intent effectuated and the only interest served by 
discretionary distribution laws are those of the matrimonial bar," p. 66. 
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defer the sale of the marital residence, assuming there was one, so that the 
custodial parent and the children could be awarded at least the use of the 
residence until the children are grown.46 Again, one could go beyond 
Glendon's suggestions and argue that an appropriate expression of our soci-
ety's commitment to the care of the children of divorce should be in the 
form of a statutory forced share of one-third to one-half of the marital 
property. Such a share would be used or invested for the benefit of the 
children while they are minors, then given to them outright at age eighteen, 
or turned over to their parents. From the perspective of children, the termi-
nation of their parents' marriage by divorce arguably should not be treated 
very differently by the law from termination by death intestate. 
As for private ordering at divorce, Glendon concedes that most divorc-
ing couples actually do resolve their differences about financial matters and 
even about child custody through private agreements. Most of these agree-
ments are incorporated into divorce decrees after receiving only minimal 
scrutiny by the court. She remains .;keptical, however, about the value of 
negotiations between the parties at the time of divorce. Her skepticism de-
rives in part from her allegiance to the second major abstraction outlined at 
the beginning of this review.47 She fears being thrust into the Weberian 
vortex, and is persuaded by the work of Friedman, Macneil and, to a lesser 
extent, Gilmore that modem contract law has become so regulatory and 
discretionary that there is very little residuary ground on which individuals 
can enter into genuinely free bargains (pp. 215-27). 
Glendon underestimates the value, in the context of divorce, of the con-
tract doctrine that survives. Classical contract doctrine has indeed been 
hemmed in by judicial desires to protect reliance, to assure "fairness", to 
protect against "oppressive" terms and to recognize adjustments made in 
the course of long-term relationships. This may mean a greater potential 
for the exercise of judicial discretion over contract terms than seems to have 
prevailed in the past; but some space is left in which individuals can negoti-
ate about matters of particular concern to them. Why not harness the en-
ergy released by the personal drive for autonomy that Glendon is so uneasy 
about and encourage individuals to forge the terms of their own divorce 
settlements? Arguably, parties benefit from being able to resolve differences 
on mutually acceptable terms, and also from being able to establish their 
own rules for governing their post-divorce behavior.48 There is even some 
empirical evidence that people do feel more committed to living according 
to the terms of an agreement they themselves have designed.49 
Glendon worries about what people might do if they are given more 
46. Pp. 81-85. Glendon claims that our case law is already concentrating on the needs of 
children. For a contrary view, at least with respect to California cases, see Weitzman, supra 
note 39; Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42-48. 
47. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
48. Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of DA-orce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 956-58 (1979). For a more sweeping, and more questionable, argument in 
favor of the use of contract and bargaining principles during marriage as well as at divorce, see 
Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Mode/for State Policy, 70 CALIF, L. REV, 
204 (1982). 
49. See, for example, the self-serving but nonetheless interesting findings on the extent to 
which people who have reached a divorce settlement through mediation are pleased both with 
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opportunities to bargain about the terms of their divorce. Perhaps they will 
not share financial responsibilities appropriately, or will try to take advan-
tage of each other's emotional vulnerabilities, or will use their children and 
their money as interchangeable bargaining chips. People may sometimes 
behave as Glendon fears, but one can instead ask, why should it matter if 
some people do not choose what others of us would choose? So long as the 
potential exists for judicial intervention to protect against abuses of the bar-
gaining process, we should feel pleasure, not alarm, that people will take off 
in different directions. Glendon is caught between her desire to prevent 
judges from imposing their own notions of what constitutes a fair bargain 
and her perhaps equally strong reluctance to let individuals go their own 
way. 
Glendon is certainly correct to insist that neither private ordering nor 
judicial enforcement of the private laws governing support and marital 
property will sufficiently ameliorate the financial disasters that so often at-
tend upon divorce. She also offers sound criticism of public law, which she 
describes as similarly torn between divergent aims and methods, hampered 
by lack of funds and undermined by "law resistant behavior" (pp. 125-38). 
Not even the "new property" derived from an individual's occupational sta-
tus can offer much hope because those who are most vulnerable to the 
financial exigencies posed by our present array of "new family" types are 
the least likely to have a secure niche in the labor force. 
In discussing employment law, Glendon makes an intriguing compari-
son to family law. In the late twentieth century, she says, it is legally as 
difficult to shed an employee as it was in the nineteenth century to shed a 
spouse (pp. 4, 153, 199). She presents an excellent account of the demise of 
classic contract principles in modern American labor law, the rise of statu-
tory and regulatory guarantees of job security for public and unionized 
workers and the recent barrage of judicial potshots at the traditional com-
mon-law employment-at-will doctrine.50 Although she cites numerous ex-
amples of how an employer's apparent legal right to discharge an employee 
is being checked by statutes or by judicial notions of "good faith" or "good 
cause," she is also keenly aware of how far American law would have to go 
before our labor force could enjoy the kind of job security that prevails in 
such countries as France, Sweden or West Germany. 
Glendon makes three observations about job-related status and benefits 
in America, each of which serves to demonstrate how limited the scope of 
this kind of new property may be. First is the problem of access. It is a 
notorious fact that blacks and women continue to have great difficulty get-
the mediation process and with the term of their agreements in J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIA-
TION (1981). 
50. See pp. 143-76. Her discussion of labor law incorporates and expands upon the mate-
rial that Glendon presented in an earlier article. See Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding 
of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. Rev. 457 (1979). 
As Glendon and others have shown, judicially-imposed limitations on the doctrine of employ-
ment-at-will may only be of benefit to white-collar employees. See Peck, Unjust Discharges 
from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979); Note, 
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rev. 335, 337-38 (1974); Note, Protecting 
At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 
HARV. L. Rev. 1816, 1837, 1844 (1980). 
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ting or holding secure or well-paid jobs. For women, the difficulty may be 
due not only to the legacy of sex-based or racial discrimination, but also to 
the perpetual tug between work and child-care responsibilities.51 This af-
fects both the kinds of jobs many women seek and the kinds they are likely 
to get. Glendon's second observation is that even those men and women 
who do have a firm place in the occupational structure may find their situa-
tions precarious. As our most recent economic experience teaches us, work-
ers with seniority are not immune to layoffs, plant relocations and other 
indirect effects of a severe recession. And, of course, the value of pensions 
and other deferred benefits may be eroded by prolonged inflation. Finally, 
Glendon notes that there is an "ambiguity" in the new property; employees 
may be locked into jobs in ways in which they would not be confined by 
tangible assets which could be sold or exchanged for other assets. Those 
who have attained some job security are reluctant to jeopardize it by mov-
ing from one position to another. The laws that enable people to acquire 
economic sustenance and status from their jobs may also have the ironic 
effect of making them the property of their jobs (pp. 192, 205). These jobs, 
moreover, may bring very little in the way of personal satisfaction. Glen-
don thus invites us to look upon a modern world inhabited by individuals 
cut loose from the emotional moorings of traditional family ties, and either 
wishing they had a job or bound to one they do not like. It is a world 
remarkably lacking in sec~rity and love. 
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Exactly what Glendon's book is supposed to add up to is not easy to 
determine. She demonstrates that contemporary family and employment 
laws embody inconsistent principles, and that these laws operate amid ra-
cial and sexual discrimination as well as amid the inequitable distribution 
of our society's wealth. But she is less successful in identifying a way out of 
our difficulties. Although she makes some specific proposals, it is not clear 
whether she favors more law, or less, to say nothing of what kind. She does 
not guide our assessments of future policy alternatives except to urge that 
we give priority to the welfare of unborn generations and that we not rav-
age our natural resources. She wants to support the function of childrear-
ing but finds no program to recommend other than one which would 
remove "the disincentives to family cooperation" (p. 137). She does not tell 
us whether she thinks affirmative action programs are wise or foolhardy. 
She claims that family law has returned to the "ancient pre-occupations of 
all law, property and violence" (p. 118); but as we have seen, she does not 
sufficiently clarify how the law should define and regulate family property. 
And she is absolutely silent on how she thinks the law ought to respond to 
the physical abuse of spouses or children. Is this a situation toward which 
the law should be "neutral" or "realistic"? 
51. Glendon writes with some sensitivity about the difficulties encountered by the many 
millions of mothers who are now trying to live with a dual commitment to their homes and 
their jobs, but she is not clear as to how or whether she thinks this dual commitment can be 
maintained. Pp. 129-38. For other analyses of the "home and career dilemma," see Friedan, 
Feminism Takes a New Tum, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 40; Shreve, Ca• 
reers and the Lure of Motherhood, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 38. 
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Glendon seems to reject the New Right's determination to use the law to 
enforce personal morality, but this rejection may be due not to a principled 
dissent from the ideal of shaping human behavior, but to doubts about the 
practical feasibility of using the law to achieve this ideal. She herself is 
anything but neutral in her attitudes toward different life styles. This is 
evidenced by her cryptic comments on "privacy" and by her avoidance of 
any discussion of whether the law should or could regulate abortion. She 
does not explicitly repudiate the expansion of every individual's social and 
sexual freedom as a goal of the law. Nonetheless, one wonders what to 
make of her statement that the "liberated 20th century individual" is appro-
priately described by a figure of speech Engels directed against monogamy: 
the tapeworm ''which has a complete set of male and female organs in each 
of its 50 to 200 proglottides or sections, and spends its whole life copulating 
in all its sections with itself."52 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Glendon's book is her disparage-
ment of the liberties won since the eighteenth century by the citizens of 
democratic states. Only grudgingly does she ever admit that the greater 
autonomy of the modern individual is a genuine benefit. She is especially 
reluctant to acknowledge as "liberation" the liberties that have accrued to 
women and children. She is preoccupied with the fear that "freedom" from 
the bonds of the traditional family will lead to the new more formidable 
imprisonment of Weber's iron cage. Marx, too, she enlists in her portrait of 
modern society as a collection of isolated private cells, but Marx's aphor-
isms fit poorly into the essentially conservative interpretation of modernity 
that Glendon seeks to develop. The prophetic attacks on bourgeois individ-
ualism Glendon quotes from On the Jewish Question were interspersed with 
equally prophetic calls for a yet fuller emancipation that would enable indi-
viduals to connect with one another on terms not dictated by the institution 
of private property. 
Glendon presents Marx as a critic of the modern ideal of privacy, but 
neglects to point out that Marx regarded the preenlightenment political or-
der as private, too; the whole society was then the private world of the mon-
arch or father.54 The evils against which Marx railed were not, like 
Glendon's favorite targets, the products of the enlightenment. Marx as-
sailed property itself, which he traces to the "latent slavery" of the tradi-
tional family of which Glendon is so uncritical.55 
Glendon's persistent suggestion that the law follows money might also 
be construed as a Marxist insight, but she does not exploit whatever poten-
tial this idea may have for sophisticated development. It is ironic, more-
over, that a book that has downplayed cultural and ideological 
considerations while mechanically attributing changes in the family and in 
the law to shifts in the locus of property should, in the end, advocate not an 
52. P. 139 (quoting F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
STATE 98 (1884)). 
53. See Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26-52 (2d ed. R. 
Tucker ed. 1972). 
54. Id at 44-45. 
55. See Marx, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 159 (2d ed. R. 
Tucker ed. 1972). 
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economic and political solution, but a religious and spiritual one. It is to an 
order of "love and meaning" that Glendon calls us at the strangely incon-
gruous climax of this otherwise nuts-and-bolts treatment of our society and 
certain of its laws. It is Aquinas, not Marx, who gets the last word (p. 243). 
Our mysteriously regenerated hearts, it would seem, are the links in the 
Golden Chain. 
